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This paper studies the eﬀects of the loss of skill on the persistence of unemployment and
other macroeconomic variables. It combines a Real Business Cycle model with a search and
matching labor market to explain how the loss of skill of workers and the subsequent decrease
in their probability of ﬁnding new jobs creates more persistent business cycles. Using numerical
simulations, the paper shows that the introduction of this mechanism improves the performance
of the model and is able to replicate cross-country diﬀerences in unemployment and output
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Macroeconomic variables, especially unemployment, show high persistence in their cyclical compo-
nents. Analyzing quarterly data from 1981 to 2004, we can observe that for the U.S. economy, the
serial correlation between unemployment rates one quarter apart is 91 percent, and 26 percent with
one year diﬀerence. In Europe, these numbers are bigger, and an economy like that of Span shows
even more persistence, with 90 percent autocorrelation for one quarter diﬀerence and 45 percent
when the distance is one year. These facts raise the question of the determinants of such high
persistence and its diﬀerences across countries.
This paper argues that a factor which aﬀects the persistence of the business cycle, in particular
the persistence of unemployment, is the loss of skill of workers who have been unemployed for an
extended period of time. It has been well documented that the probability of ﬁnding a job decreases
with the duration of unemployment, and that the longer the spell of unemployment, the higher the
possibility of deterioration of the human capital of the worker1. Hence, we build a model, calibrate
it, and perform simulations to understand how numerically important is the loss of skill of workers
to explain the persistence of unemployment and other macroeconomic variables.
The model incorporates a search and matching labor market into a Real Business Cycle (RBC)
model. It assumes inﬁnitely lived risk-averse agents who decide how to best allocate their wealth
1Bover, Arellano and Bentolila (2002) show that for the Spanish economy, the probability of ﬁnding a job decreases
steadily with the duration of unemployment and is reduced by half for individuals who have been out of work for
over a year. Jackman and Layard (1991) ﬁnd that the exit rate from unemployment decreases when there is a higher
proportion of the long-term unemployed. They also note the relationship between the duration of unemployment and
the possibility of atrophy of the skills of the worker.
2between consumption and savings. They also supply labor to ﬁrms which produce a homogenous
good. It uses a simple version of the RBC model which abstracts from capital accumulation or any
type of rigidity or ineﬃciency except for the search and matching friction in the labor market2.
This market is modeled in the style of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), where job destruction is
endogenous, although we also assume that matches can be exogenously destroyed, as in den Haan,
Ramey and Watson (2000). We assume a single type of ﬁrm, which hires either low or high skilled
workers. Both types of workers are equally productive, although low skilled workers must undergo
training in their ﬁrst period of work, whereas high skilled workers do not. The cost of training
makes low skilled workers less attractive to ﬁrms since it reduces their proﬁts. This in turn implies
that low skilled workers ﬁnd jobs with a lower probability than the high skilled. This probability is
endogenous in the model and depends on the cost of training. The loss of skill occurs over time and
is modeled as a random process, transferring workers from the high to the low skilled unemployment
pool. The longer a worker is unemployed, the more likely it is that he loses the skill.
This paper ﬁnds that introducing the loss of skill mechanism in this framework increases the
persistence of unemployment and other variables with respect to the model with one skill, and
makes the model closer to the data in terms of the autocorrelations of variables. This model can
also replicate the diﬀerences in persistence in unemployment across countries. This is shown by
calibrating and simulating the model to the extreme cases of Spain and the U.S. We ﬁnd that the
loss of skill mechanism is more important for explaining macroeconomic ﬂuctuations for economies
with a high unemployment and high proportion of long-term unemployment, such as Spain, than
2 The theoretical structure of the model is kept to the minimum to isolate the eﬀects of the loss of skill from other
mechanisms which aﬀect unemployment and output ﬂuctuations.
3for economies with the opposite labor market features, such as the U.S. We also show that the
model with loss of skill is able to partially address the critiques of Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005)
to the search and matching models. We ﬁnd that for the Spanish calibration, the model with skill
deterioration generates higher volatilities in unemployment, vacancies and market tightness than
the model with one skill. However, there is still a gap between theory and data, and the loss of skill
mechanism does not improve the performance of the model in this respect for the U.S. economy 3.
The intuition for the increase in persistence is as follows. When the economy suﬀers a negative
shock, employment drops and unemployment increases. Given the matching friction in the economy,
unemployed workers cannot return to work instantaneously. Both the reduction in vacancies,
due to the reduction in proﬁts, and the increase in unemployment, decrease the probability of
unemployed individuals ﬁnding jobs, lengthening their unemployment spell. The increase in the
duration of unemployment raises the chances of workers losing their skill, which eventually leads
to an increase in low skilled unemployment. Both the increase in unemployment and the increase
in the proportion of the low skilled, who have even lower probability of ﬁnding jobs, raises the
average duration of unemployment in the economy and the persistence of unemployment and other
macroeconomic variables. This intuition also helps explain the ability of the model to replicate the
higher persistence in unemployment observed in countries which have a higher unemployment rate
and higher proportion of long-term unemployment. The increase in volatility in the two skill model
for economies where the loss of skill is important is due to the fact in the model with skill loss,
the proportion of low-skilled workers increases in recessions and decreases in expansions, making
3Sala and Silva (2005) study a version of the search and matching model which addresses speciﬁcally the Shimer-
Hall critique for both the U.S. and Spanish economies.
4total unemployment more responsive to shocks and also generating higher ﬂuctuations in vacancies,
since the low skilled pool is less attractive to ﬁrms.
The loss of skill of unemployed workers has been previously used in the literature to explain the
diﬀerences between unemployment levels in the U.S. and Europe. Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004)
and den Haan, Haefke and Ramey (2005) use this mechanism to analyze the rise of unemployment
in Europe in the eighties, although they reach diﬀerent conclusions4. The former argues that
diﬀerences in institutions and labor market characteristics, such as unemployment beneﬁts, help
explain how an increase in the rate of loss of skill of workers raises unemployment in economies like
those of Europe, but it does not have such a big impact in an economy with the features of the
U.S. On the other hand, the latter show that the results shown in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004)
depend critically on the assumption that only workers who have been ﬁred, and not those who quit,
lose their skill. However, neither of the two studies analyzes the cyclical behavior of unemployment
and other macroeconomic variables.
Pissarides (1992) shows that the temporary eﬀects of employment shocks last longer when
unemployed workers lose their skill over time. His analysis is purely qualitative, but the mechanism
which creates the more persistent dynamics is similar to the one in this paper. When workers
lose their skill they become less attractive to potential employers and few ﬁrms enter the market,
making the labor market thinner and lowering the probability of ﬁnding work for every type of
worker. Another paper which studies the consequences of the loss of skill on the dynamics of
unemployment is Eriksson (2006). He uses a one-sided-search model and shows simulations of the
4Another important related paper which uses a search and matching model with multiple skills to perform steady
state analysis is Albrecht and Vroman (2002).
5eﬀects of technology shocks on unemployment for a German calibration of the model. However,
no results on persistence or volatility moments of the variables are shown. In this paper we try to
quantify the mechanism studied by Pissarides (1992) and show that this more persistent eﬀect of
shocks can be extended to other macroeconomic variables. To do so, it is necessary to work with
a more complete model, one which includes production, consumption and the other elements that
the business cycle models take into consideration.
Other papers have addressed macroeconomic ﬂuctuations within a framework which combines
a business cycle model with a search and matching labor market. Merz (1995) and Andolfatto
(1996) are the best known references. However, these two papers, although performing well in other
aspects, are not able to replicate the persistence in unemployment and output observed in the data,
except by assuming very low re-employment rates5. Pries (2004) challenges these previous studies
by developing a model which generates higher persistence on labor market variables by assuming
not low hiring rates but high ﬁring rates for newly formed matches. However, since no simulation
moments are shown by Pries, it is not possible to understand the quantitative importance of his
mechanism. Our paper uses a diﬀerent explanation for the high persistence of unemployment and
claims what the previous literature lacks is the additional eﬀect that the loss of skill has on the
persistence of labor market and other macroeconomic variables.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the model, explaining
5As shown by Cole and Rogerson (1999), in order to replicate certain business cycles facts, low job ﬁnding rates
need to be assumed. These low re-employment rates are only consistent with the data if workers loosely attached to
the labor force, which are low intensity searchers, are counted as unemployed. This is one of the assumptions made
by Andolfatto (1996), who calibrates the model to a 40 percent unemployment rate.
6the problem of the household and the problem of the ﬁrm and the worker. Section 3 explains the
calibration of the parameters. Section 4 presents the results of the paper and Section 5 summarizes
the main conclusions.
2 The Model
This is a discrete time model with two types of agents, workers/consumers and ﬁrms. The problem
of these agents is presented below.
2.1 The Problem of the Household
The economy is composed by a continuum of individuals of mass one, which consume and supply
labor to ﬁrms. Each individual has the following per period utility:






where Ct is the level of consumption and Lt the hours worked in period t. γn > 0 and an > 0.
In order to avoid the heterogeneity problem resulting from the employment status of the agent,
we follow the standard in the literature and assume that all of the individuals belong to a big
family where earnings are pooled together as an insurance mechanism. The family also enforces
that those members matched with ﬁrms perform the work. Firms are assumed to be owned by this
large household and all their proﬁts rebated to it. The household decides the level of consumption
and savings in order to maximize its life time utility.







βi [u(Ct+i) − Ht+i]
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subject to




Bt+i + Bt+i−1 (3)
for i = {0,...,∞},
where β ≤ 1 is the discount rate of the economy; Ht is the disutility suﬀered by the household from
the hours supplied by its working members. Hours of work do not appear explicitly, since they are
not chosen by the household, but by decentralized bargaining between each ﬁrm and worker. Πt
is the proﬁts rebated by the ﬁrms; nt is the number of employed workers; b is home production
of those individuals who are not working; Wt is sum of all the wages paid to the workers; tw
t nlt
is the share of all the training costs which is paid by the workers; Bt is the number of real bonds
purchased, and rt the real interest rate in the economy.
This problem yields the following optimal conditions:
Consumption Euler equation, which shows how in equilibrium the individual is indiﬀerent be-








Budget constraint, in which bonds do not appear since in equilibrium their demand is equal to
zero,
(5) Ct = Πt +( 1− nt)b + Wt − tw
t nlt.
82.2 Labor Market
In the labor market workers and ﬁrms engage in employment relationships, which are composed of
one ﬁrm and one worker.
Unemployed workers are assumed to be either high or low skilled. Workers who have just lost
their job retain their skill for some time. The loss of skill, which only happens while being out of
work, occurs with probability λ for the high skilled unemployed workers who are not matched with
a ﬁrm.
Firms can hire either type of unemployed worker. Both types are equally productive, although
the low skilled needs to be trained during the ﬁrst period of employment. Training has a cost t,
which is shared between the worker and the ﬁrm. After the period of training, the worker becomes
high skilled.
Vacant ﬁrms and unemployed workers meet randomly according to a matching function m(ut,v t),
where ut = ult +uht, ut is total unemployment, ult and uht are low and high skilled unemployment
respectively, and vt is the number of vacancies. The matching function is assumed to be constant








where θt = vt
ut is the market tightness of the labor market.
If the search process is successful, ﬁrms produce output according the production function
Yt = AtLυ
t where At is the level of technology of the economy and Lt the number of hours worked
by the employee. The aggregate technology level is At = A(1−ρA)A
ρA
t−1e t ,w h e r eA is the steady
state level of technology and  t is an i.i.d. aggregate technology shock. The costs of production
9for the ﬁrm are the wages paid to the worker, the cost of training if the worker is low skilled and
a ﬁxed cost ηt. This latter cost, which can be interpreted as the cost of intermediate inputs other
than labor, is idiosyncratic to the ﬁrm and independent and identically distributed across ﬁrms and
time, with distribution function F :[ 0 ,∞] → [0,1]. A new cost is drawn every period by the ﬁrm.
Employment relationships are dissolved either exogenously, which occurs with probability ρx,
or endogenously, if the cost of intermediate inputs is too high and both ﬁrm and worker decide to
discontinue the relationship and explore other options. The value of η which dissolves the match
is denoted by ¯ ηt and can be diﬀerent for ﬁrms which hire high or low skilled workers, since the
latter have to pay the extra cost of training. Newly formed matches need to draw an intermediate
input cost, and hence may never start production if the cost is high enough, but for simplicity it is
assumed that they cannot be destroyed by exogenous forces.
The timing of the model is as follows: at the beginning of every period, a proportion ρx of ﬁrms
who have been producing during the previous period are destroyed for exogenous reasons. The
remaining matched ﬁrms draw an intermediate input cost. This new cost and the current level of
technology determine the new threshold of endogenous destruction ¯ ηit for i ∈ {l,h} and establishes
total destruction. After destruction takes place, the levels of employment, high, and low skilled
unemployment are determined. At that point, the household decides the level of consumption and
savings, and through bargaining with the ﬁrm, wages and hours of work are chosen. Once these
decisions are made, production starts at ﬁrms, and vacancies and unemployed workers try to meet.
High skilled workers who are not matched with ﬁrms can suﬀer the loss of skill, after which they
become low skilled and have to wait until the following period to search again.
102.3 The problem of the ﬁrm and the worker
Firms post vacancies in the labor market and, when matched with a worker, implement optimal
production plans in order to maximize their proﬁts. Posting vacancies has a ﬂow cost of k for the






If the ﬁrm is matched, and the idiosyncratic shock is low enough, in the following period the ﬁrm
obtains the value of being ﬁlled by worker of type i; otherwise it remains as a vacancy. Denote by
Vt and Jit (ηt) the values, measured in terms of consumption, of having a vacancy opened and of a
match for a ﬁrm which hires a worker of type i. Hence, the value of a vacancy is6








































where βt = β
Ct
Ct+1
is the eﬀective discount factor since ﬁrms are ultimately owned by households.
Free entry of ﬁrms is assumed in equilibrium, which implies that the value of a vacancy must
be zero.
The value for the ﬁrm with a high skilled worker is
(7) Jht (ηt)=AtL
αy












The interpretation of the previous equation is as follows: during the current period, given the
ﬁrm’s idiosyncratic cost of intermediate inputs, ηt, the ﬁrm produces output and pays wages and
6Note that the threshold for the intermediate input cost which makes the low skilled match unproductive is
diﬀerent from that for the high skilled match. During the ﬁrst period of the match, the low skilled unemployed needs
to be trained and that cost lowers the acceptable intermediate input cost.
11the cost of these inputs. In the following period, if it is not exogenously destroyed and the idiosyn-





, otherwise the match is destroyed and it becomes a vacancy, which has value zero.
A ﬁrm which hires a low skilled worker has a similar present value. This diﬀers only in the fact
that the ﬁrm has to pay its share of the cost of training, t
f
t , which also implies a diﬀerent wage.
Note that the continuation value is the same as the one for the high skilled ﬁrm, since the worker
becomes high skilled after the ﬁrst period.
(8) Jlt(ηt)=AtL
αy
t − ηt − t
f












Given the previous expressions, we can deﬁne the total amount of ﬂow proﬁts made by ﬁrms as















where ˜ ηit and ˜ witLt are respectively the average intermediate input cost and wage paid to a worker
in a productive employment relationship of skill i in period t.
L e tu sc o n s i d e rn o wt h es i d eo ft h ew o r k e r .D e n o t eb yUit and Nit (ηt) the value, in terms of
consumption, of being unemployed and being matched with a ﬁrm for a worker of type i ∈ {l,h}.
A high skilled unemployed worker obtains ﬂow utility b from being unemployed. If it matches
with a ﬁrm, which happens with probability pt = m(θt), and the intermediate input cost for the
ﬁrm is below the threshold, ¯ ηht+1, he becomes a productive worker the following period. If the
search process is not successful, he may lose the skill, an event which occurs with probability λ,
and become low skilled unemployed. If he does not enter into an employment relationship with a
ﬁrm and does not lose the skill, he remains a high skilled unemployed. Hence, the value of being
12high skilled unemployed at period t is:
(10)
























Similarly, a low skilled unemployed worker receives ﬂow utility from home production. He can meet
a ﬁrm, and begins producing the following period if the idiosyncratic shock to the ﬁrm is favorable.
Otherwise, he remains a low skilled unemployed.
























As in the case of the ﬁrm, the value of a match for a worker is a function of the idiosyncratic
shock ηt. It also depends on the skill of the worker. The value of employment for a high skilled
worker is composed of the high skilled wage, the disutility in terms of consumption from supplying
labor, and the continuation value, which is the value of being employed if the match is not destroyed,
or the value of being high skilled unemployed if it is.


































If the worker comes from the low skilled unemployment pool, the value is very similar and only




































13When an employment relationship takes place it creates a surplus which is shared between the
ﬁrm and the worker. The surplus of the match is deﬁned as the sum of the values of a ﬁlled job for
a ﬁrm and a worker minus their outside options, which are the value of a vacancy and the value
of unemployment, respectively. Since there is free entry of ﬁrms, the expression for the surplus is
Sit (ηt)=Jit (ηt)+Nit (ηt)−Uit for i ∈ {h,l}. The sharing rule for the surplus is obtained optimally
as the Nash solution to a bargaining problem. Such a solution implies that both parties obtain a
constant fraction of the surplus equal to their bargaining power. If βw is the bargaining power of
the worker, then Nit (ηt) − Uit = βwSit (ηt) and Jit (ηt)=( 1− βw)Sit (ηt). Combining these two
expressions with equations (7) to (13), the surplus in terms of units of consumption for a high and
low skilled match can be expressed as:
Sht (ηt)=AtL
αy
t − ηt −
h(Lt)
u0 (Ct)


















λ(Uht+1 − Ult+1) (14)
Slt(ηt)=AtL
αy
t − ηt − tt −
h(Lt)
u0 (Ct)























− Etβt (Uht+1 − Ult+1). (15)
The division of the surplus between ﬁrm and worker yields the wage paid to the employee. The
expressions for the wages paid to a high and low skilled worker are respectively:














































+ b − Etβt (Uht+1 − Ult+1)
¸
.
The worker is compensated for a proportion βw of the production of the ﬁrm net of the intermediate
input cost, and for a measure of the saved cost of searching for new matches. He is also compensated
for a fraction (1 − βw) of the disutility from supplying labor, and the forgone home production. The
last term of the expression reﬂects the fact that by being hired in a ﬁrm, the high skilled worker
avoids the risk of becoming low skilled. The low skilled worker also beneﬁts from being hired, since
he gets trained and his value of unemployment increases once the match is destroyed.
Total wages paid in the economy can be deﬁned as
(18) Wt = nht ˜ whtLt + nlt ˜ wltLt.
The number of hours worked at every employment relationship is chosen to maximize the
surplus. This is optimal for the ﬁrm and the worker since both the surplus and the wages depend















The optimal amount of hours supplied by the work depends positively on the technology level and
negatively on the level of consumption, due to the decreasing marginal utility of consumption. Note,
15however, that it does not depend on the cost of intermediate inputs of the ﬁrm or the skill of the
worker, which is a consequence of the additive nature of that cost and the assumption that both
types of workers are equally productive.
An employment relationship is terminated endogenously when the idiosyncratic intermediate
input cost to the ﬁrm is so high that it drives the surplus to zero. This determines the threshold
cost above which both worker and ﬁrm agree to dissolve the match and search for better options.
Using equations (14) and (15) and equating them to zero, we can obtain the expressions for the
low and high skill thresholds.
Given the timing explained earlier, the ﬂows in and out of the diﬀerent states for the workers
are:
uht =( 1− pt−1F (¯ ηht))(1 − λ)uht−1 +( ρx +( 1− ρx)(1− F (¯ ηht)))nht−1+ (20)






ult−1 + ρxnlt−1 +( 1− pt−1F (¯ ηht))λuht−1 (21)
nht =( 1− ρx)F (¯ ηht)nht−1 +( 1− ρx)F (¯ ηht)nlt−1 + pt−1F (¯ ηht)uht−1 (22)
nlt = pt−1F (¯ ηlt)ult−1 (23)
1=ult + uht + nlt + nht. (24)
This economy can be supported as a recursive competitive equilibrium.
3 Calibration
In this section we explain the parametrization of the model.
16The parameters are chosen to match the empirical evidence on the long run values of the
variables in the model, which would correspond to the steady state of the model. The benchmark
calibration is done for the Spanish economy, since the model is more relevant for economies such as
that one, where both the unemployment rate and the proportion of long-term unemployment are
high. However, the calibration strategy is the same for the U.S. economy, and a short description
of the parameters used for the U.S. simulations can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix.
The length of a period is one month. The discount factor of the economy is β =0 .997,w h i c h
implies a quarterly real interest rate of 1 percent.
The labor share in the production function, αy, is set to 0.66, as is standard in the literature.
The steady state labor supply is assumed to be L =1 /3, which implies that on average 8 hours per
day are devoted to work. The steady state level of technology, A, is normalize to 1.
The ﬂow value of leisure, or home production, b, is assumed to be 40 percent of ﬁrm’s production,
as in Shimer (2005). Setting b to this low value, compared to that preferred by Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2007), allows the results to be easily comparable with those found by Shimer (2005). b
is set to 0.19.
Following Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), the bargaining power of the worker, βw, is set 0.5.
The parameter in the utility function γn is set to 1, which implies quadratic disutility from
labor supply. an is calibrated using the optimal labor supply, equation (19), and the steady state
level of hours, technology and consumption, and set to an =8 .7.
The matching function is assumed to be constant returns to scale, and takes the form m(ut,v t)=
µuα
t v1−α







ϕ. Following Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) we set α =0 .5. To derive the values for
the scaling parameter in the matching function, µ, the parameter characterizing the exponential
distribution,ϕ, the cost of posting a vacancy, k, and the probability of skill loss, λ, we use the
steady state equations of the model and impose the following empirical facts. The unemployment
rate is 0.17, which corresponds to the average between 1981q1 and 2004q4. Disaggregated data
by length of the unemployment spell is only available for the sample period 1987q2 to 2004q4.
According to this data, the proportion of unemployed workers which have been without a job for
more than 12 months is 0.5, hence we set the proportion of low skilled unemployed to 0.5 of total
unemployment. The monthly probability of leaving unemployment is 0.13, as in Sala and Silva
(2005). Following Shimer (2005) we normalize the market tightness, θ, to 1, since this simply
rescales µ and k without aﬀecting the probability for a worker to ﬁnd a job in the model. The
implied values for the parameters are µ =0 .17,ϕ=0 .12,k=0 .021 and λ =0 .1. This last parameter
implies that the probability at the beginning of the period of losing the skill is 0.086, or equivalently,
the average unemployed high skilled worker takes 12 months to lose the skill. Setting λ in this way
justiﬁes the association of long-term unemployment in the data with low-skilled unemployment in
the model.
Given the steady state unemployment rates and the probabilities of leaving unemployment and
losing the skill, the steady state separation rate is 0.026. Given the lack of better empirical esti-
mates, we assume that the exogenous separations are 68 percent of total separations, as estimated
by Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996) for the U.S. economy. Hence, ρx =0 .018.
Bover, Arellano and Bentolila (2002) estimate the probability of exiting unemployment as a
18function of unemployment duration. They estimate that for the Spanish economy, this probability
is reduced by half for workers who have been unemployed for a whole year. Therefore, since the
matching probability is the same for both types of workers and the diﬀerence in the transition from
unemployment to employment for low skilled workers is marked by the cost of training, we impose
that the probability of a successful match for a low skilled worker is half of that for a high skilled,
and set the training cost to t =0 .89 to match this fact.
Technology follows a ﬁrst order autoregressive process, At = A(1−ρA)A
ρA






.W e s e t ρA =0 .983 ,a n dσ2
  =0 .04 so that the simulations match the empirical ﬁrst
order autocorrelation and volatility of productivity in Spain from 1981q1 to 2004q1, which are 0.74
and 0.01 respectively.
Table 1 shows the values of all the parameters in the model.
Table 1
4R e s u l t s
Now that the model and calibration have been explai n e d ,i ti sp o s s i b l et oq u a n t i f yh o wm u c he x t r a
persistence is generated by the inclusion of skill loss in the model. In the introduction of the paper,
we noted the high persistence of unemployment over the business cycle and its diﬀerent behavior
in the U.S. and Europe, specially with the extreme case of Spain. Here we present more concrete
empirical evidence on these facts and we show how this model can partially explain them through
the introduction of the loss of skill of workers and the subsequent costly training.
Given the recent criticisms by Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005) of the ability of the search and
19matching models to replicate the volatility of vacancies and unemployment over the business cycle,
we also provide some results on how the model performs in this dimension.
We start by presenting the impulse responses of the main variables of the model to a negative
technology shock, which allows us to understand the intuition behind the higher persistence gener-
ated by the model. We then show the simulation autocorrelation results, and ﬁnally we show the
volatility results to study the Shimer-Hall critique in this context.
The results shown in Tables 2 through 5 are obtained by simulating the economy for 288 months7
and 100 repetitions. We then calculate quarterly averages of the variables and obtain the statistics
of interest. Finally, we calculate averages and standard deviations of the statistics for the 100
replications. The impulse responses in Figure 1 and A1 are also quarterly averages of the monthly
responses simulated with the model.
4.1 One vs. Two Skills
Figure 1 shows the response, in percent deviations from the steady state, of the main variables of the
model to a one time 1 percent negative technology shock when the model is calibrated to Spanish
data. The solid line corresponds to the response of the model with one skill and the bulleted line
to the model with two skills.
Comparing the responses of the two models, we can clearly observe that the model with skill
depreciation generates a more pronounced and persistent response for all the variables except for
job destruction. Total unemployment, the main variable of interest in this paper, increases in both
models after the negative shock, but increases by more, peaks later, and takes longer to return to the
7The model is simulated for 488 months and the initial 200 observations of each repetition are dropped.
20steady state for the model with two skills. The reason for the higher and more persistent response
can be understood by considering the other variables. On impact, the technology shock decreases
job creation and increases job destruction. Both eﬀects make high and low skilled unemployment
increase, which raises total unemployment. With higher unemployment, the probability of ﬁnding
a job decreases for all workers, and hence increases the average duration of unemployment. The
extra eﬀect in the model with skill deterioration comes from the fact that with time, some of the
high skilled unemployed workers lose their skill and enter the low skilled unemployment pool. In
this latter state, workers have even a lower probability of ﬁnding work, which further decreases
the average probability of ﬁnding a job, making unemployment very persistent. We can observe
from the impulse response functions that high skilled unemployment peaks after two quarters and
later even drops below the steady state. This fact, which is consistent with den Haan et al.
(2005), is caused by the reaction of high skilled workers, who in the face of the negative shock
are not as willing to quit their jobs for fear of losing the skill while unemployed. This reaction of
high skilled workers makes the job destruction rate also drop below the steady state level. The
response of low skilled unemployment is higher in magnitude and much more sluggish, peaking
after eight quarters and showing a slower return to the steady state. The more persistent response
of low skilled unemployment is explained by the low probability of ﬁnding work and the slow
entry of high skilled workers into this pool. Since low skilled unemployment constitutes half of
the steady state unemployment for the Spanish economy, the strong and persistent response of
unskilled unemployment is the driving force behind the higher persistence of total unemployment
in the model with two skills compared with the model with one skill.
21The response of vacancies to the technology shock is also diﬀerent for the two models. In
both cases, vacancies decrease following the shock, but the response of the two skill model is more
pronounced and persistent. The stronger and more sluggish response of vacancies in the model with
two skills is driven by the fact that, after the shock low skilled unemployment increases substantially
and takes very long to converge back to the steady state. The higher proportion of low skilled in
the pool of unemployed workers decreases the willingness of ﬁrms to post vacancies, since those
workers need to be trained and oﬀer lower proﬁts in the short run.
The response of the other main variables of the model is as follows. Employment decreases
after the shock, mirroring the increase in unemployment since there are no inactive workers in
the economy. Hours of work decrease on impact and go temporarily above the steady state to
later slowly return to the long run levels. Initially, the reduction in the technology level of the
economy decreases the marginal product of labor, and given the disutility suﬀered by the worker
from supplying labor, it makes leisure more attractive and reduces the number of hours of work.
The temporary increase in hours above the steady state is due to the fact that the optimal supply
of hours is a function of the utility obtained through the extra consumption derived from working
extra hours. Given the properties of the utility function, the drop in consumption following the
negative technology shock, places the agent in a region of the utility function where an increase in
consumption produces a bigger increase in utility. This eﬀect dominates the negative impact on the
supply of hours due to the reduction in technology and temporarily increases the supply of hours.
The decrease in technology, employment, and hours reduce output and consequently consump-
tion. Slowly, these two variables return to the steady state as the direct eﬀects of the shock and
22their indirect consequences through the sluggish movements in the labor market disappear.
Figure 1
4.2 Cross Country Analysis
The previous section showed how the model proposed in this paper generates a more sluggish
unemployment response to a shock, compared to a model which does not take into account the
loss of skill of unemployed workers, when the model is calibrated to the Spanish economy. This
section analyzes the ability of the model to explain cross country diﬀerences in the persistence of
the business cycle, speciﬁcally in the persistence of unemployment and output. The benchmark
simulations are performed by calibrating the model to an extreme case, the Spanish economy,
which is characterized by a high level of unemployment and an elevated proportion of long term
unemployment. Thereafter, the other extreme is taken and the model is put to test by analyzing
its ability to explain the persistence of the cyclical unemployment in the U.S. economy, where this
level is low, as is the fraction of long term unemployment.
The case for the Spanish economy is shown in Table 2. We can see how the model which takes
into account the loss of skill of workers is able to create more persistence on unemployment and
the same amount of persistence on output. For the sample period of 1981q1 to 2004q4, the Spanish
economy shows a ﬁrst order autocorrelation of 0.90 and fourth order autocorrelation of 0.45. The
model presented in this paper delivers autocorrelations of higher magnitude and closer to the ones
in the data than the model with one skill. Another level in which the model is successful is in being
able to generate higher persistence for the low skilled unemployed compared to the high skilled.
23This is something we observe in the data if we identify short term unemployment with high skilled
unemployment in the model8. The model with two skills also delivers more persistence in output
compared with the one skill model, although it is not as close to the data as for unemployment.
Table 2
Table 3 shows the results of the simulations for the U.S. economy. U.S. unemployment is less
persistent than that of Spain in the data. The ﬁrst order autocorrelation is very similar in both
countries, being 0.91 for the U.S., but the fourth order autocorrelation is 0.26 for the U.S. versus
0.45 in Spain. Calibrating the model to U.S. empirical evidence9, we observe that both models
generate this lower persistence observed in the U.S., but again the model with skill deterioration
generates more persistence. The gap between the two models is smaller for the U.S. than for Spain,
however. This is due to the lower proportion of low skilled unemployed in total unemployment10,
which implies that the behavior of total unemployment is mostly driven by the behavior of high
skilled unemployment. The diﬀerence between the two models is almost non-existent when looking
8This identiﬁcation is appropiate for the Spanish economy calibration, since the rate of skill loss, λ, implies that
on average workers take one year to lose the skill. One year is also the length of time a worker must be out of work
to be considered long-term unemployed in the data. The association of low skilled and long-term unemployed cannot
be done for the U.S., due to the lack of quarterly data on the number of workers unemployed for longer than one
year.
9See the Appendix for details on the U.S. calibration.
10I no r d e rt ob ea b l et om a k eac l e a nc o m p a r i s o nb e t w e e nt h er e s u l t sf o rS p a i na n dt h eU . S . ,w es e tt h er a t eo fs k i l l
loss, λ, to the same level in both economies, 0.1. For the U.S., this implies a fraction of low skilled unemployment
of 0.12, which is not far from the average proportion of workers who were unemployed for more than 1 year, 0.09,
between 1987 and 2004 according to yearly data from the OECD.
24at persistence of output. We can also observe this smaller diﬀerence between the two models by
looking at the impulse responses in Figure A1 of the Appendix.
Table 3
In summary, these results show the ability of the model to not only create higher persistence
in unemployment and output than a model which does not consider the loss of skill, but also to
reproduce the diﬀerences in unemployment persistence in economies as diﬀerent as Spain and the
U.S. We now test the model in a diﬀerent dimension.
4.3 Shimer-Hall Critique
Shimer (2005) shows that the standard Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching model fails to
generate suﬃcient volatility in vacancies and unemployment compared to the data11. Although the
objective of this paper is not to solve this puzzle, it is interesting to investigate the performance
of the two skill speciﬁcation in this dimension. Tables 4 and 5 show the standard deviation and
autorcorrelations of vacancies, unemployment, and market tightness for the Spanish and U.S. sim-
ulations respectively. Looking at Table 4, we observe that for the Spanish calibration, the model
with skill loss is able to generate higher volatility and persistence in unemployment and vacan-
cies, which in turn generates higher volatility in the market tightness. The reason for the higher
volatility and persistence of these variables is that in the model with skill loss, the proportion of
low-skilled workers increases in recessions and decreases in expansions, making total unemployment
11Diﬀerent solutions to this puzzle have been proposed in recent years. A short and incomplete list of some of
these papers include Hagedorn and Manovskii (2007), Krause and Lubick (2007), Gertler and Trigari (2006), Andres,
Domenech and Ferri (2006) and Sala and Silva (2005). This last paper deals speciﬁcally with the Spanish economy.
25more responsive to shocks and also generating higher ﬂuctuations in vacancies. That is, compared
with the model with no skill loss, in the model with two skill, vacancies posted increase further over
the steady state value in good times driven by the lower proportion of workers who require training,
and in bad times they decrease further below the steady state value for the opposite reason. Hence
ﬂuctuations in unemployment, vacancies, and market tightness are ampliﬁed by the existence of
skill deterioration. However, despite the improvement brought by the introduction of skill loss in
the model, this mechanism by itself is not suﬃcient to bridge the gap between the volatilities in
the model and the data. Speciﬁcally, the volatility of vacancies is still lower than in the data and
so is that of market tightness.
Table 5 shows the results for the U.S. and corroborates some of the ﬁndings stated earlier. We
can see that for an economy like that of the U.S., with low unemployment and a low proportion of
long-term unemployed, the impact of loss of skill on the variability and persistence of unemployment,
vacancies, and market tightness is minimal.
Hence, although the loss of skill mechanism is not intended to explain the Shimer-Hall critique
to the search and matching models, it does help to bring the model closer to the data in this respect
for economies with high unemployment and high proportion of long-term unemployment.
Table 4
Table 5
265C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper studies the quantitative eﬀects of the introduction of the loss of skill as a mechanism
to increase the ability of business cycle models to explain the cyclical persistence of unemployment
and other macro variables.
The model presented here combines a real business cycle model with a search and matching
labor market, which has the additional characteristic that workers can lose their skill if they are
unemployed for an extended period of time. These workers need to be retrained in order to be
productive, and this costly training has an eﬀect on their chances of ﬁnding work. When a negative
shock hits the economy, raising unemployment and decreasing the overall probability of becoming
employed, the loss of skill of workers who are unemployed for a long period of time further decreases
the average possibility of returning to work, and raises the overall duration of unemployment. This
mechanism makes unemployment more persistent than in a model which ignores it.
The simulations of the paper show quantitatively that the introduction of the loss of skill
mechanism helps the model become closer to the data in terms of the persistence of unemployment
and output. First, unemployment persistence, measured through its serial correlations, is increased,
and that of output is drawn close to the data by the introduction of the loss of skill mechanism.
Second, the model is able to replicate the diﬀerent cyclical persistence of unemployment across
countries, and we show that the loss of skill mechanism is more important for economies with high
unemployment and a high proportion of long-term unemployment, such as Spain, than for economies
such as the U.S. with low unemployment and a low incidence of long-term unemployment, where
workers are not unemployed long enough for this mechanism to have a substantial eﬀect. Finally,
27we also show that for the economies similar to that of Spain, the model with skill deterioration
is capable of partially addressing the Shimer-Hall critique, by generating higher ﬂuctuations in
unemployment, vacancies, and market tightness.
6A p p e n d i x
Parametrization of the Model for the U.S. Economy. The calibration for the U.S. economy is done
following the same procedure as in the Spanish calibration, but targeting the following empirical
facts obtained by using U.S. data from 1981q1 to 2004q4: 6 percent unemployment rate; 0.35 job
ﬁnding rate12; productivity autocorrelation and standard deviation of 0.76 and 0.01, respectively.
The rest is the same as in the benchmark calibration. Note that the probability of skill loss, λ,
is set to the same value as in the Spanish calibration (0.1), which allows us to perform a clean
comparison between the results of the model for Spain and the U.S. The calibrated parameters are
shown in Table A1. The impulse responses of the main variables to a negative technology shock
are shown in Figure A1.
Table A1
Figure A1
12The job ﬁnding rate is calculated using the methodology described in Shimer (2005).
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31Table 1: Parameters of the Model - Spanish Calibration
Exogenous parameters
   = 0.997   n = 1  A  = 1  y = 0.66  w = 0.5    = 0.5
Endogenous parameters
  = 0.1  t = 0.89 k = 0.021 b = 0.19 an = 8.7 µ = 0.17
 x = 0.018    = 0.12  A = 0.98    = 0.004
32Variable corr(Xt,Xt-1) corr(Xt,Xt-2) corr(Xt,Xt-3) corr(Xt,Xt-4)
Total Unemployment
Data a 0.90 0.77 0.61 0.45
Model with 1 Skill 0.88 0.65 0.40 0.17
(0.03) (0.08) (0.11) (0.14)
Model with 2 Skills 0.90 0.71 0.49 0.28
(0.03) (0.07) (0.11) (0.13)
Low Skilled Unemployment
Data b 0.89 0.76 0.61 0.47
Model with 2 Skills 0.91 0.74 0.53 0.31
(0.03) (0.06) (0.10) (0.13)
High Skilled Unemployment
Data c 0.80 0.62 0.42 0.24
Model with 2 Skills 0.79 0.44 0.15 -0.06
(0.05) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13)
Output
Data a 0.93 0.83 0.70 0.57
Model with 1 Skill 0.83 0.58 0.34 0.13
(0.04) (0.09) (0.12) (0.14)
Model with 2 Skills 0.85 0.64 0.42 0.21
(0.04) (0.08) (0.12) (0.14)
Table 2: Serial Correlations of Unemployment and Output - Spain
Notes: Data source: Labor Force Survey (Encuesta de Poblacion Activa) for unemployment variables and 
Quarterly National Accounts (Contabilidad Trimestral de España) for output. All data is seasonally adjusted, 
taken logs and detrended using HP filter with smoothing parameter of 1600.  Standard errors are shown in 
parenthesis.
a. Total unemployment rate and Real GDP. Sample: 1981q1-2004q4. 
b. Unemployed who have been out of work for more than 12 months. Sample: 1987q2-2004q4.    
c. Unemployed who have been out of work for less than 12 months. Sample: 1987q2-2004q4.
33Variable corr(Xt,Xt-1) corr(Xt,Xt-2) corr(Xt,Xt-3) corr(Xt,Xt-4)
Total Unemployment
Data 0.91 0.74 0.51 0.26
Model with 1 Skill 0.81 0.52 0.26 0.06
(0.05) (0.10) (0.13) (0.14)
Model with 2 Skills 0.86 0.62 0.37 0.15
(0.03) (0.08) (0.12) (0.14)
Output
Data 0.88 0.68 0.43 0.17
Model with 1 Skill 0.76 0.46 0.23 0.05
(0.06) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13)
Model with 2 Skills 0.75 0.46 0.23 0.06
(0.07) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
Table 3: Serial Correlations of Unemployment and Output - U.S.
Notes: Data source: Bureau of Labor Statistics for unemployment and NIPA for output. Sample: 1981q1-2004q4. 
All data is seasonally adjusted, taken logs and detrended using HP filter with smoothing parameter of 1600. 
Standard errors are shown in parenthesis.
34Variable Std corr(Xt,Xt-1) corr(Xt,Xt-2) corr(Xt,Xt-3) corr(Xt,Xt-4)
Vacancies
Data 0.20 0.75 0.46 0.22 0.03
Model with 1 Skill 0.04 0.51 0.12 -0.06 -0.16
(0.00) (0.09) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10)
Model with 2 Skills 0.06 0.72 0.51 0.36 0.21
(0.01) (0.09) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
Unemployment
Data 0.07 0.90 0.77 0.61 0.45
Model with 1 Skill 0.04 0.88 0.65 0.40 0.17
(0.01) (0.03) (0.08) (0.11) (0.14)
Model with 2 Skills 0.09 0.90 0.71 0.49 0.28
(0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.11) (0.13)
Market Tightness
Data 0.23 0.78 0.52 0.31 0.12
Model with 1 Skill 0.06 0.71 0.41 0.19 0.03
(0.01) (0.07) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
Model with 2 Skills 0.14 0.87 0.69 0.49 0.29
(0.03) (0.04) (0.08) (0.11) (0.13)
Table 4: Serial Correlations and Volatilities of Labor Market Variables - Spain
Notes: Data source: Labor Force Survey (Encuesta de Poblacion Activa) for unemployment and OECD Main 
Economic Indicators for vacancies. Sample: 1981q1-2004q4. Market tightness is calculated as the ratio of 
vacancies and unemployment. All data is seasonally adjusted, taken logs and detrended using HP filter with 
smoothing parameter of 1600. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis.
35Variable Std corr(Xt,Xt-1) corr(Xt,Xt-2) corr(Xt,Xt-3) corr(Xt,Xt-4)
Vacancies
Data 0.12 0.91 0.74 0.50 0.24
Model with 1 Skill 0.02 0.24 -0.07 -0.11 -0.11
(0.00) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
Model with 2 Skills 0.02 0.79 0.60 0.39 0.19
(0.00) (0.07) (0.09) (0.11) (0.13)
Unemployment
Data 0.09 0.91 0.74 0.51 0.26
Model with 1 Skill 0.06 0.81 0.52 0.26 0.06
(0.01) (0.05) (0.10) (0.13) (0.14)
Model with 2 Skills 0.06 0.86 0.62 0.37 0.15
(0.01) (0.03) (0.08) (0.12) (0.14)
Market Tightness
Data 0.20 0.74 0.51 0.20 -0.06
Model with 1 Skill 0.06 0.73 0.43 0.21 0.04
(0.01) (0.07) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
Model with 2 Skills 0.08 0.86 0.64 0.39 0.17
(0.02) (0.03) (0.08) (0.11) (0.14)
Table 5: Serial Correlations and Volatilities of Labor Market Variables - U.S.
Notes: Data source: Bureau of Labor Statistics for unemployemt and Shimer (2005) for vacancies (for additional 
details, see Shimer (2005) and http://home.uchicago.edu/~shimer/data/flows). Sample: 1981q1-2004q4. All data 
is seasonally adjusted, taken logs and detrended using HP filter with smoothing parameter of 1600. Standard 
errors are shown in parenthesis. 
36Table A1: Parameters of the Model - U.S. Calibration
Exogenous parameters
   = 0.997  n = 1 A  = 1  y = 0.66  w = 0.5
   = 0.5   = 0.1
Endogenous parameters
t = 1.97 k = 0.076 b = 0.19 an = 8.13 µ = 0.44
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